Update on MCE
September 23, 2026







I continue to write about MCE because I represented Richmond on the MCE Board until I was termed out as mayor in January of 2023, at which time I was serving as Board chair. When I left, MCE
was in good shape and was delivering electricity cheaper than PG&E.

 

Over 80% of Richmond residents and businesses get the electricity generation portion of their PG&E bill from MCE. There has been a lot of criticism of MCE over the past several months, most of
it resulting from a 10% spike in MCE rates compared to PG&E generation rates (See

The MCE Smear Campaign, June 25, 2026
). One result is there is a move to reduce the 34-member board (See

MCE Moves toward reducing 34-member board
). I was interviewed by Erik Douglas of Leading Resources, Inc, which completed a management study of MCE, and I told him the number of board members was not a problem, but apparently, he concluded otherwise.

 

There has also been criticism that MCE’s power sources are not truly “green,” which is inaccurate. Below is a summary of MCE power sources, all of which are zero-carbon, compared to 67% for California
utility average.

 

Figure 1 – Source:
https://mcecleanenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/2025-PCL-Marin-Clean-Energy.pdf

From the beginning, the highest priority of MCE has been to deliver greener power, not to deliver cheaper power. However, over the past 15 years, MCE rates have been lower than PG&E rates half
the time and when they have exceeded PG&E rates, the difference has been minimal. On average, over the past 15 years, MCE rates have exceeded PG&E by only 0.64%. That’s slightly over one-half of one percent.

 

Figure 2 – Source: MCE

MCE and other CCAs (Consumer Choice Aggregators) have been hampered by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), whose commissioners are appointed by the governor. Unfortunately, the
governor has appointed commissioners that are biased in favor of the Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs), in our case, PG&E. Arguably CCAs, do not even need CPUC regulation because they are managed by elected officials. It would be like the governor of the State
of California appointing some unelected individuals to have complete oversight over the actions of a city council or county board of supervisors.

 

The reason PG&E customers saw a slight savings this year compared to MCE is that the CPUC allowed PG&E to retroactively apply to 2026 PCIA charges from the prior year (2025).
This is very confusing, and it has affected all the CCAs in PG&E’s territory. The good news is that this cost differential is expected to reverse at the end of 2026, and based on projections, PG&E’s costs (generation + PCIA) are likely to again be higher than
MCE charges starting in January 2027. 

 

One of the ways the CPUC thwarts the power of CCAs is imposing a “Power Charge Indifference Adjustment” (PCIA) that is like a tax on CCAs that increases their costs. For example, in 2025, the
MCE costs of power was 16.1% less than PG&E, but after the PCIA levy, it was 1.6% more. While there is a rational base for levying a PCIA, the process has not been transparent, opening the door for abuse. In the most recent legislative session, a bill was
introduced by Assemblymember Chris Rogers (D-Santa Rosa), AB 1761,that  passed the Assembly 65-9 and the Senate 40-0 to make the PCIA calculation process more transparent. Governor Newsom vetoed it at a time California continues to grapple with high electricity
costs and as the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) considers changes to the PCIA charge. CalCCA has argued that customers and the electricity providers serving them should have meaningful access to the underlying data, assumptions, and methodologies
used to establish PCIA charges.

 

Governor Newsom is not a friend of CCAs or electricity consumers.

 

 

Year

Rate

PG&E Generation

MCE Generation

PG&E PCIA/Franchise Fee

MCE + PG&E Fees

PG&E Delivery

MCE vs. PG&E Gen Rates*

MCE vs. PG&E – Fully Loaded Costs*

2012

E-1

$                0.07076

 $                0.06900

 $               0.00890

 $          0.07790

-2.5%

10.1%

2013

E-1

$                0.07884

 $                0.07400

 $               0.00664

 $          0.08064

-6.1%

2.3%

2014

E-1

$                0.09202

 $                0.07900

 $               0.01164

 $          0.09064

 $      0.11485

-14.1%

-0.7%

2015

E-1

$                0.09745

 $                0.08200

 $               0.01234

 $          0.09434

 $      0.11612

-15.9%

-1.5%

2016

E-1

$                0.09684

 $                0.07200

 $               0.02323

 $          0.09523

 $      0.13961

-25.7%

-0.7%

2017

E-1

$                0.09817

 $                0.07543

 $               0.02264

 $          0.09807

 $      0.13479

-23.2%

0.0%

2018

E-1

$                0.10780

 $                0.06800

 $               0.03401

 $          0.10201

 $      0.14148

-36.9%

-2.3%

2019

E-1

$                0.11194

 $                0.06800

 $               0.03404

 $          0.10204

 $      0.13793

-39.3%

-4.0%

2020

E-TOU-C

$                0.11752

 $                0.08700

 $               0.03397

 $          0.12097

 $      0.16200

-26.0%

1.2%

2021

E-TOU-C

$                0.11418

 $                0.08700

 $               0.03879

 $          0.12579

 $      0.17831

-23.8%

4.0%

2022

E-TOU-C

$                0.12154

 $                0.10378

 $               0.02064

 $          0.12442

 $      0.20089

-14.6%

-6.8%

2023

E-TOU-C

$                0.13697

 $                0.14544

 $               0.00400

 $          0.14944

 $      0.20698

6.2%

-0.5%

2024

E-TOU-C

$                0.16289

 $                0.14535

 $               0.01223

 $          0.15758

 $      0.29072

-10.8%

-3.1%

2025

E-TOU-C

$                0.17422

 $                0.14617

 $               0.01178

 $          0.15795

 $      0.29030

-16.1%

1.6%

2026

E-TOU-C

$                0.12211

 $                0.11634

 $               0.03720

 $          0.15354

 $      0.29107

-4.7%

10.1%

*Positive % = MCE rate is more expensive, Negative % = MCE rate is cheaper

Source: MCE

Regarding the move to reduce the number of members on the MCE board, it may be a good idea, but it does not necessary. The number of board members was designed to provide each city or county
direct representation. There are other public agency boards in the Bay Area with a large number of board members, such as BCDC with 27, ABAG Executive Committee with 38 and MTC with 21. Like MCE, most of the hard work is done by committees.

 

Finally, the founding executive director of MCE, Dawn Weisz, who was fired in June , 2026, presumably as a result of rate increases, is pursuing a claim against MCE for unlawful termination.

 

 

 

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: September 21, 2026

Contact: Jackson McDonough

(925) 597-1995 | jackson@cal-cca.org

 

Governor Newsom Vetoes CalCCA-Sponsored Bill to Bring Transparency to PCIA Charges

Veto leaves California customers without consistent access to the data used to determine billions of dollars in energy costs

SACRAMENTO, Calif.—Governor Gavin Newsom has vetoed Assembly Bill 1761, legislation sponsored by the California Community Choice Association (CalCCA) that would have established greater transparency requirements for the data used to calculate
the Power Charge Indifference Adjustment (PCIA), a charge imposed on millions of electricity customers in California.

 

“We are deeply disappointed that the Governor has vetoed a bill that passed with overwhelming bipartisan support and was designed simply to bring greater transparency and accountability to a charge that affects millions of California electricity
customers,” said CalCCA Chief Executive Officer Beth Vaughan. “Customers should not be asked to pay a charge that they cannot independently evaluate.”

 

For CalCCA, the veto also comes amid a broader pattern of regulatory and legislative decisions that the association says have placed Community Choice Aggregation (CCA) customers at a disadvantage relative to ‘bundled’ investor-owned utility
(IOU) customers. In recent months, CalCCA has challenged CPUC decisions involving PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E that it says shift costs to CCA customers, including decisions affecting the PCIA. CalCCA has argued that these actions undermine the statutory principle
of ratepayer indifference and the level playing field that California law established between Community Choice energy providers and IOUs.

 

In his veto message, Governor Newsom expressed concern that AB 1761 could result in improper dissemination of market-sensitive information while at the same time suggesting the CPUC already has processes for making applicable data available,
including through confidentiality procedures. CalCCA’s experience, however, is that access to the information underlying PCIA calculations has been inconsistent and can require repeated disputes before the CPUC. Moreover, the Commission itself withholds key
inputs to the PCIA charge.

 

CalCCA’s analysis supporting AB 1761 documents multiple examples of the types of errors increased transparency could prevent. In a 2019 PG&E proceeding, CalCCA identified $73 million in errors, including a $16 million increase in costs
for CCA customers. More recently, in 2025, PG&E identified an accounting error that would have resulted in an estimated $217 million in additional costs for CCA customers. CalCCA has also raised concerns that, in an ongoing PCIA rulemaking, the CPUC withheld
information underlying a proposal and its rate impacts and did not respond to a Public Records Act request seeking that information.

 

AB 1761 was specifically structured to address this problem. The bill would have required the CPUC and IOU to disclose data used to calculate PCIA costs, including cost inputs, forecasting assumptions, and methodologies. CalCCA’s proposal
also supported ongoing protections for market-sensitive information through Commission-approved nondisclosure agreements.

 

The PCIA is intended to ensure that customers who leave investor-owned utility generation service, including customers served by Community Choice Aggregators (CCAs), continue to pay their share of certain legacy power costs. Because Community
Choice customers are required to pay the charge, CalCCA has argued that CCA representatives need sufficient access to the underlying information to verify its accuracy, evaluate proposed changes, and forecast customer costs.

 

CalCCA will continue to advocate for greater transparency in the CPUC’s ongoing PCIA proceedings. The association has identified access to IOU and CPUC data as an issue for consideration in the next phase of the Commission’s PCIA rulemaking.
Learn more about the PCIA and CalCCA’s advocacy efforts here: https://cal-cca.org/pcia/.

 

 

 

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