As the National Pearl Harbor Remembrance Day approaches on December 7, it is interesting to reflect on what failures in readiness led to the devastating attack.

As I was compiling Cecilia King’s Extraordinary Senior Trip, I dove for context into pre-WWII history, reading the Herman Wouk novel, The Winds of War, followed by War and Remembrance. I even watched the 1983 miniseries on YouTube.

Figure 1 - Cecilia King, Christmas 1940

I found and read Paul Dixon’s The Rise of the GI Army, 1940-1941, and I just finished Henry Clausen’s Pearl Harbor Final Judgment and found From Here to Eternity enlightening. 

Pearl Harbor Final Judgment was fascinating because it includes some people who crossed paths with my mother, Cecilia King, and also confirmed what a mess Hawaii defenses were in. Pearl Harbor Final Judgment is particularly compelling. It was written by a lawyer, Henry C. Clausen, who joined Army JAG when the war broke out. Just by happenstance, he ended up directed by Secretary of War Stimson in 1945 to undertake the definitive investigation of the cause of the Pearl Harbor debacle. He traveled from Europe to Asia taking depositions from mostly high ranking officers, including flag officers – even Douglas MacArthur, all with special authority from Stimson.  MacArthur told him that he "had to barter like a rug merchant throughout the war to get the intelligence I have needed from the Navy." 

At the end of the day, the report focused on two officers and some of their subordinates, Lt. Gen Walter C. Short, who was the commander of the Army Hawaii Department and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. He also concluded that the failure of the Army and Navy to share and coordinate intelligence due to interservice rivalry and poor judgment was a huge factor.

Here is where it gets interesting. General Short’s predecessor was Gen. Charles B. Herron, the father of one of my mother’s best friends in Hawaii, Louise Herron, and my mother also dated the general’s son, Billy Herron. She knew the Herrons well.

On December 27, 1940, Mother wrote, “Much excitement over new Gen. replacing Herron at Shafter. Name of Short. No one seems to know him.” It turns out that Short was not up to the job and did not want to be there – nor did his wife, who was high maintenance. Herron apparently took his job of defending Hawaii seriously and tried hard to prepare Short for the command, but Short was not receptive. Herron prepared an extensive briefing book that Short was to study on the ship to Hawaii, but Short blew him off. Clausen writes, quoting Herron, “Upon my meeting Short when he arrived, “ said Heron, “ I asked him whether he had read the papers and material. He replied that , “…he had not given them much time while enroute.” Herron said he asked Short if he had read the briefing book. Short replied, “ No, I did not. I read a novel, Oliver Wisnell.”

Another officer Clausen interviewed was Brig. Gen. Robert H. Dunlop, the father of Bob Dunlop, one of my mother’s most frequent dates. Gen. Dunlop, was adjutant general of the Hawaii Department from June 1941 until a considerable time after Pearl Harbor. My mother knew the Dunlops well and liked them. Gen. Dunlop provided Clausen with important information about Short’s failures.

Clausen ultimately wrote, “the debacle at Pearl Harbor was the result of Short’s and Kimmels’s being asleep at the switch.” Clausen describes LTG Short's Hawaiian command, the :”Pineapple Army, “as “a perpetual happy hour. Both Short and Kimmel were later relieved of their command and returned to civilian life.

Figure 2 - Walter Campbell Short (Wikipedia)

Clausen’s report was part of a Congressional investigation in 1946 that turned political as Republicans tried unsuccessfully to blame President Roosevelt and Army Chief of staff Gen. George Marshall for Pearl Harbor as a strategy to get the US into the war.